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Although Japanese institutional investors continue to favor hedge funds andfunds of hedge funds over other alternative investments, more and moreJapanese pensions, banks, and insurance companies a re now seriously
exploring opportunities in private equity.
How can Japanese investors effectively identify and conduct due diligence on
promising private equity funds? If such funds prove attractive, how can they obtain
access in cases where capacity is limited? Once invested, what methods are avail-
able to these investors to accurately value the private equity portfolios and monitor
the ongoing operations of their fund managers? And how should they measure these
managers’ performance? 
To examine these and related questions, the Program on Alternative Invest-
ments hosted its second seminar and roundtable in Tokyo on March 11, 2005.
Organized and moderated by Dr. Mark Mason, Program Director, the seminar and
roundtable featured as principal speakers Andrew Golden, President of the
Princeton University Investment Company (Princo); John Alouf, Senior Investment
Officer, Private Equity, at the Virginia Retirement System (VRS); Toru Masuda, Senior
Manager in the Global Credit Investment Management Department of Sumitomo
Trust & Banking; and Akihiro Nakamura of the Pension Fund Association of Japan. 
These proceedings were divided into two main sessions. The first session was
in the form of a seminar with participants drawn from the Japanese public and 
private pension fund communities, and the second session was in the form of a
roundtable discussion with representatives from the Japanese banking and insur-
ance communities. This report covers the initial presentations by the featured speakers
together with the subsequent question and answer periods that followed.
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ANDREW K.  GOLDEN
A n d rew K. Golden has served as President of the Princeton
University Investment Company (Princo), the organization
responsible for managing Princeton’s endowment, since
January 1995. During that time, the assets of the endow-
ment have grown from under $4 billion to more than 
$10 billion, after net withdrawals of approximately $1.25
billion to fund University operations.
Princo’s investment returns for the most recent ten
fiscal years (ending June 30) were 15.5 percent, placing
Princo among the highest performing endowments in the
country. The endowment is broadly diversified and
invests in United States and foreign public and private
equities, independent return funds, real assets, and fixed
income.
Mr. Golden joined Princo from Duke Management
Company, where he was an Investment Director. Prior to
that time, he served as a Senior Associate in the
Investments Office at Yale University. Mr. Golden holds a
B.A. from Duke University and an M.P.P.M. from the Yale
School of Organization and Management. He has earned
the Chartered Financial Analyst designation and is a mem-
ber of the New York Society of Security Analysts. Mr.
Golden was a member of the Board of Directors of the
NAB Asset Corporation, a publicly traded commercial
loan workout specialist. He currently serves on fund advi-
sory boards for several private equity and venture capital
managers, including Bain Capital, General Catalyst
Partners, and Venrock Associates. 
In addition to his work at Princo, Mr. Golden serves
as a Trustee of The Nathan Cummings Foundation, the
Princeton Area Community Foundation, and Rutgers Pre p -
aratory School. Mr. Golden is married to Carol Litowitz
Golden, resides in Princeton, and has two young sons
who, despite their genetic heritage, are quite athletic.
TORU MASUDA
Toru Masuda is currently in charge of private e q u i t y
investment, supporting affiliate companies’ business activi-
ties, and developing private equity-related business for
Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., Ltd. Since joining the
bank in 1988, Mr. Masuda has developed expertise in 
various fields, such as M&A advisory, direct investment to
venture companies, and business consulting. In addition,
he was located in the London branch from 1996 to 2000,
managing investments in Japanese high-yield bonds and
emerging market portfolios. Since 2000, he has been on
the PE investment team in Tokyo, playing a key role in
fund management.
M r. Masuda, CFA, graduated with a B.A. in economics
from Osaka University.
JOHN P.  ALOUF
John Alouf is a Senior Investment Officer at the Virginia
Retirement System, the state’s $43 billion pension fund.
Mr. Alouf is part of a three-member team responsible for
expansion, management, and oversight of $7 billion in
private equity commitments. The investment portfolio of
the private equity group consists of approximately 200
partnership interests allocated between venture capital,
buyout, growth capital, mezzanine, distressed, and energ y
funds. Prior to joining VRS, Mr. Alouf was an associate at
Private Advisors, a private investment firm focused solely
on alternative assets. He also worked for Cambridge
Associates, a financial consulting firm, as an investment
performance analyst. He received an M.B.A. from the
College of William & Mary and a B.B.A. from James
Madison University.
SPEAKER PROFILES
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MARK MASON
Mark Mason is Director of the Program on Alternative
Investments. He was formerly a tenured professor of
International Business at Georgetown University and prior
to that a professor at the School of Management, Yale
University. His current research examines the evolving
strategies of Japanese institutional investors in hedge
funds, private equity, and other alternative investments in
Japan and abroad. 
Dr. Mason is the author of American Multinationals
and Japan (Harvard University Press) and Europe and the
Japanese Challenge (Oxford University Press), as well as
numerous articles in leading business and management
journals. In addition, he has been widely quoted in pub-
lications such as Business Week, the Economist, the
Financial Times, the New York Times, and the Wall Street
Journal. Dr. Mason frequently speaks at conferences on
alternative investments. He holds a Ph.D. from Harvard
University.
A K I H I RO NAKAMURA
Akihiro Nakamura has served as Leader of the Pension
Management and Evaluation Group, Pension Fund Asso-
ciation, since 2004. After graduating from the Meiji Gakuin
University Faculty of Law in 1987, he joined the Pension
Management Division, transferring to the Ministry of Health
and Welfare (currently called the Ministry of Health,
Labour and Welfare), Pension Bureau, in 1990 and then to
the Japan Center for Economic Research in 1999. In 2000,
he became Chief of the Investment Research Department
of the Pension Fund Association. 
Mr. Nakamura was selected as one of the “25 remark-
able pension officials in the world” by Pensions & Invest-
ments magazine in 1999. He is also a member of the
Security Analysts Association of Japan. His publications
include Kakei no Kinyu Sisan Sentaku to Shisan Haibun
(Household Financial Asset Selection and Asset Allo-
cation), Japan Center for Economic Research; and Kinyu
Fukyo no Jissyo Bunseki (Positive Analysis of Financial
Depressions), Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc.
MARK MASON
Director
Program on Alternative Investments
Center on Japanese Economy and Business
Columbia Business School, Columbia University
This forum is designed to facilitate objective and frank
discussion of alternative assets from the viewpoint of the
institutional investor. The first meeting of the series was
held this past December in Tokyo, and the theme was
investing in hedge funds and funds of hedge funds. Our
second meeting today examines investments in private
equity. We have selected a number of general themes to
explore, including the valuation of private equity portfo-
lios, manager selection, performance measurement, and
the secondary market.
Our lead speaker this morning is Andrew Golden,
P resident of the Princeton University Investment
Company (or Princo). Princo is generally considered to be
a member of the “golden circle” of U.S. university endow-
ments when it comes to investment management and per-
formance. I understand that 2005 marks the tenth year
Andy has managed the endowment at Princeton, during
which time assets have grown from less than $4 billion to
more than $10 billion.
ANDREW K.  GOLDEN
President
Princeton University Investment Company
Thank you, Mark. I would first like to explain our invest-
ment philosophy. I’ve been involved in endowment man-
agement for two decades, but before that I had a separate
career as a professional photographer and also studied
philosophy. These different hats have created the context
of how I think about endowment management, which I
call the blues philosophy. To borrow the words of the
great blues singer Mose Allison: “I don’t worry about a
thing because I know nothing is going to turn out all
right.” This captures a key element about investing: noth-
ing ever turns out as one expects.
In order to discuss how we approach private equity
investing, it’s important to understand our endowment
and how we think about investing in general. We take a
very holistic view. We try not to separate our thinking into
buckets, but to take similar approaches across the entire
portfolio based on our objectives and goals.
The endowment is large for a university endowment.
At the end of our last fiscal year on June 30, 2004, our
assets were worth roughly $10 billion. We’re now almost
$11 billion, making us one of the largest endowments for
a U.S. university in terms of dollars per student. It’s a crit-
ical resource for the university, contributing almost 40
percent of the revenues for the whole school.
Our goal for the endowment is to spend it and sup-
port the university, to provide the same benefits to future
generations as it does to the current generation. That
means we need to have a consistent, high rate of return
over time. We try to spend between 4 percent and 5 per-
cent each year, and we think of inflation as a number
that’s of similar magnitude. We need to build up a reserve
fund because we know we won’t be able to generate
returns of 9 percent each year, which means we need to
look at 10 percent or so in returns year after year.
And we have achieved that. The endowment has
grown at a rate of 12.2 percent over the last couple of
decades, reflecting investment performance. While there
are gifts that come in each year, they are less than the
amount of money that we spend. 
Everything we do is through a partnership with an
external money management firm. We don’t do any
hands-on investing for several reasons. We want to have
the world’s best experts at the helm of each of our ships
in our very big fleet. With all the different categories we
invest in, we don’t think we could develop that kind of
world-class expertise within our own organization. In any
one area, we would be competing against firms that have
more people, more specialized knowledge, and more
experience targeting that specific area. By partnering with
them, it exploits one of our competitive advantages. 
Partnering also gives us flexibility to fine-tune the
portfolio by changing our exposures with some phone
calls. We have sixteen investment professionals managing
more than a hundred relationships. Interestingly, about a
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third of the time we spend making decisions is directed at
private equity. Private equity is one of the most labor-
intensive areas in which we invest, even though it repre-
sents less than 15 percent of the portfolio. 
While I’ve been at Princeton for ten years, it’s only
been the last five years that I can truly claim that I was
the Chief Investment Officer. Prior to that, it was the
Chairman of the Board who approved every single signif-
icant decision. Since gaining this new authority, we have
been very active in fine-tuning the portfolio. We moved
more than $7 billion worth of funds around our manager
roster by fine-tuning the dollars to exploit specific oppor-
tunities as they’ve come up. We kept track of how our
portfolio would have performed without that fine-tuning
and found out that we would have made $860 million
less. I mention this to point out that we can be very active
in the management of the portfolio even though we are
not on the front lines.
Our chief advantage is our very long horizon.
Spending less than 5 percent a year, we do not have
much need for liquidity. This gives us a chance to take a
long-term view and to help others that need liquidity.
Another important advantage is what we call our
“Goldilocks” size, which refers to the endowment being
not too big or too small, but just right. At $11 billion, we
are big enough to cost-effectively support a research staff
that can understand alternative investments and find
opportunities off the beaten path. But we are not so big
that those opportunities cannot have a meaningful impact
on our bottom line.
We take a multistep approach to asset allocation.
First, we think about things in a valuation-independent
framework. We don’t think about what is going on in the
markets today. Instead, we think about basic investment
truths, our distinctive circumstance as an investor, and
about what mix would make sense over a very long horizon.
A basic investment truth, for example, is the idea that
investors demand return, and, over long periods of time,
they should receive compensation for any discomfort, like
not being able to get your money when you need it,
painful market volatility, or the inability to see through
your portfolio. The list goes on and on. But we know it
would not make sense for there not to be a reward. 
About 88 percent of our portfolio is invested in equity
or equity-like positions (see Slide 10). We need to do that
to earn those high re t u rns, but only 17 percent is invested
in traditional domestic equity. A similar amount is seen in
our international equity holdings, which is roughly split
between developed and developing markets. About 25
percent is invested in a category called “independent
return,” a subset of the hedge fund universe. It involves
managers who go long and sell short and managers that
exploit event-driven investments, like bankruptcy or com-
panies undergoing significant corporate change. About 15
p e rcent is private equity, while 14 perc e n t is in real estate,
which also includes energy and timber.
Our performance has been strong over time (see
Slide 12). If you look at the difference between our port-
folio’s return over ten years, it’s been up 15.5 percent per
year versus our main benchmark that’s been up 11.7 per-
cent. Private equity has been the strongest-performing
asset category at almost 20 percent, but it’s gotten there
the hard way. The year 2000 was very strong, but it 
hasn’t been most recently. But this is part of our program.
We know that over time some categories will do well 
and some categories won’t, but over time, it will balance
out. 
Here’s a flavor of our actual private equity program,
which is about $1.1 billion. There’s $1.8 billion in out-
standing commitments waiting to be drawn down by
eighty-nine different managers. Of those eighty-nine man-
agers, fifty-two are active partnerships. We have invested
mostly in the United States but have made investments
with managers based in the UK, Italy, Scandinavia, China,
India, and even Japan. We are making an effort to find
more partners outside the United States because we sense
that local managers have an edge and should understand
their own environment better.
Until recently, we thought that there weren’t a lot of
experienced investors outside the United States, particu-
larly in private equity. That is changing, so we now have
a grand unifying theme for our entire program: to build
up our international network of managers and other
sources of intelligence to the level in the United States.
That is one reason why I am here today and why I have
traveled to Asia five times in the past fifteen months.
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The private equity program has been a key source of
strength (see Slide 21). In the year 2000, for example, the
endowment overall returned 35.5 percent. It would have
been less than half of that if we had not invested in pri-
vate equity, particularly venture capital. That said, private
equity has been a drag on our returns more recently, but
that’s okay. It goes back to our concept of diversification;
we know that not everything is going to be helpful all the
time.
The important thing to understand about the valua-
tion of portfolios is that it is more art than science. Even
in marketable areas, the true value of your portfolio is a
bit more of an illusion than many would like to think. I
contrast private equity, for example, with the NASDAQ
market. Do we really think that the value of the market,
which is stated with great precision at any given moment,
could be that volatile? Could the true value really change
that much, and, given the size of our portfolios, is it real-
ly a true value anyway? We know we could not liquidate
the whole portfolio at that price. Yet there is an illusion
in public markets that you know the value of your port-
folio. 
When we do our own valuations, we start with a
number provided by the general partner, and, if warranted,
we’ll revise it down. The managers themselves are oper-
ating with great flexibility, and there aren’t any ironclad
industry standards. For example, a venture capitalist will
tend to value a portfolio at cost unless someone else
comes in and provides additional financing at a higher
price. Venture capitalists will also write down a portfolio
if there is reason to believe the intrinsic value has been
impaired. In the buyout world, the standards are much
more flexible. 
Here’s an unusual question: Why should we care
what the value of the portfolio is? Valuations can be used
to evaluate our program or managers, but we think that
there are better ways to assess and understand this. That
said, while there’s great imprecision to our valuation
methods, there seems to be a conservative bias. We get
back more money when investments are liquidated than
what they have been marked at. 
We look at performance in a variety of ways. There
are different questions that we ask, including dollar rates
of return or internal rates of return (IRRs). If we look at
our performance over ten years, 60 percent of the returns
can be explained by cash we’ve already gotten back from
the program. We don’t have to worry about the value of
that. In fact, if we were to write the portfolio down to
zero, or not give credit for the market value right now, the
program still would have been very profitable and strong.
When U.S. investors measure performance, they tra-
ditionally look at managers versus similar funds or apply
the so-called vintage fund analysis. This sheds more light
than looking at the overall program. The actual perform-
ance is less important than figuring out what’s been driv-
ing performance. We really care most about performance
because we want to know how we should act in the
future, which is why we emphasize quantitative analysis
to see whether it’s reputable. 
Our holistic approach to managing our portfolios is
highly labor intensive. We focus on manager selection
and use a bottom-up approach. Finding crude investors is
more important than having a top-down view of where to
invest. Our top-down analysis is more about where we’ll
spend time to search for managers, but we never force
money to work if we cannot find a good partner.
A new phenomenon is that we find ourselves selling
ourselves to managers even though we are buying their
services. The best managers can be highly selective, so
we have to make a point as to why they should select us
over others. We show prospective managers the benefit
that we brought to others, and our goal is to be the best
client. We do that by working creatively with them to
solve some of their business risk issues. One way we can
do that is by being very flexible, including things like
diversification limits. If they find something really good,
we can be flexible and let them invest a large share of the
portfolio in one way or another. This makes sense
because the risk to us is much less than it is to them since
they are just a small part of our portfolio.
What do we look for in managers? Most important is
their ability to add fundamental value to a company. This
is the key advantage of private investments: the ability of
managers to make a company better. We think it’s impor-
tant and obvious that a manager should have the ability
to see the best deals. They should be very smart. They
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should negotiate well and have discipline. They should
also understand risk and have a high moral character. The
firm should make sense and promote stability over time. 
We are very selective with funds. Last fiscal year we
invested in four venture capital funds out of the sixty-five
deals we looked at and under 7 percent in buyouts. The
secondary market is not really of much interest to us.
From time to time, there are attractive purchases, but most
likely we make that purchase to strengthen our relation-
ship with a great manager.
Private equity is a great long-term fit for Princeton,
but it may not be for you. It’s important to have the com-
petitive advantage; otherwise, private equity could be a
disadvantage.
SL IDE 1 SLIDE 2
SL IDE 3 SLIDE 4
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TORU MASUDA
Senior Manager
Global Credit Investment Management Department
Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., Ltd.
Within Sumitomo Trust, we have what we call the Credit
Investment Management Department, which consists of
twenty people who look only at private equity, venture
capital, and buyout funds—with commitments totaling
roughly $750 million.
As mentioned earlier, investing in private equity is
very labor intensive, and it takes time until you generate
good returns, performance, and liquidity. So before you
invest, you need to know why you’re going to invest.
Consultants and trust bank experts will say many things
in order to make private equity one of your investment
options, so it’s important to understand the characteristics
of the product. 
Why did Sumitomo Trust start investing in private
equity? There are many reasons, but the firm’s goal is to
get a 10 percent return-on-equity for the funds we get
from shareholders and depositors. For trust banks, private
equity is an attractive alternative to equity over the long
term. When there’s growth in the economy and corporate
sector, private equity is a great asset. But how do you go
about it? Various factors should be taken into account.
First, can it be bought in a small amount? Generally, 
the minimum investment in a fund is $5 million to $25
million. Second, there are choices as to the style of invest-
ment—whether it is top-down or bottom-up—which
means there’s a choice in managers. When a manager is
good, that manager should show a 10 percent return.
My preference is to diversify, but that may not work
in all markets. For example, it’s hard to diversify in yen-
denominated assets, so that’s when I handpick a good
manager. However, if we’re investing in the United States,
Europe, or China, then I would look at assets that achieve
a high return. The investment structure depends on the
maturity of the market and the capacity of the investor.
Some may like to invest in a small fund or a fund of
funds, while others will invest more over a longer period. 
In Japan, there are two ways to invest in private equity.
One is to use a trust bank; the other is to use an invest-
ment advisory company. It’s not really that significant one
way or the other, but it’s important that the firm devise the
right investment program for you. The real difference is in
terms of procedure and not much else. It’s important to
monitor the inflow and outflow of cash, how much is
drawn down, and how the cash is returned. If you deter-
mine the trend of cash flow, you’ll start to see some 
disparity among different managers.   
What are the risks? It’s hard to judge the performance
of a private equity investment only looking at statistics. In
this sense, a bottom-up approach becomes more impor-
tant. Also, looking at the fine print of a manager’s
prospectus is quite hard. Different managers use different
numbers to illustrate their performance. We get a lot of
prospectuses sent to us, but we don’t read them very
much because it’s not so significant to make a decision
just from the numbers in the prospectus.
Lastly, a word of caution. Don’t trust every word that
an investment banker tells you. It’s important for pension
funds interested in private equity to ask other pension
funds who are already in the game about their problems.
There should be an investor network, so specific issues
and experiences can be discussed. Don’t just rely on the
information you get from the service vendors. 
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JOHN P.  ALOUF
Senior Investment Officer 
Virginia Retirement System
The Virginia Retirement System (VRS) is a $43 billion pen-
sion fund with seventy different general partners. We
invest solely in limited partnerships. We are in about two
hundred different funds, and our net return since 1989 is
23.7 percent. 
Private equity is an investment in securities that are
not traded in public markets. The asset allocation we have
for the VRS is a mix between venture capital, buyouts,
mezzanine, distressed, and energy. Our investments in the
buyout market are essentially making acquisitions using a
mix of debt and equity in the United States, usually about
60 percent debt and 40 percent equity. For venture capital
and growth, they’re primarily all equity financing based
on the lack of earnings in these businesses. Mezzanine
financing is like a middle layer, subordinated to debt. It is
senior to the equity and is primarily seen as a current
return with some upside through equity kickers such as
warrants.
Why do we invest in private equity? To generate
superior returns to the public markets. But as mentioned
earlier, if you do not invest with a top quartile manager,
your performance is going to be minimal, at best. It is a
nice diversification tool for the portfolio but it’s also a
long, illiquid investment. The partnerships we invest in
are typically for ten years. The first half of that is pretty
much the investment period, while the second half is the
maturation or distribution period, where they’re harvesting
the investments that have been made.
There is an alignment with the general partners, in
that they do receive a substantial profit allocation, typi-
cally 20 percent of the overall gains in each partnership.
To explain this, look at the J-curve effect (see Table 5, p.
30). During the first three years or so, net cash flow
becomes more and more negative. As goals are realized,
cash flow starts turning upward and hopefully you’re
going to reach a profitable investment by the sixth year.
Historically, private equity has outperformed public mar-
ket returns (see Table 6, p. 30), and there’s a huge differ-
ence between managers as well (see Table 7, p. 30).
I’ll talk a little bit about current investment opportu-
nities and what we find attractive. In the U.S., we like
middle-market buyouts, or funds between $250 and $750
million. In Europe, we also like middle-market buyouts,
but I am very cautious about investing in venture capital
there. It is starting to mature, but the returns have not
been overwhelming so we’re extremely selective. There’s
also blue chip venture capital, but that’s a very select
group of partnerships that are difficult to get into.
One way to provide liquidity in private equity is to
use the secondary market. It’s becoming quite mature,
and as maturity occurs in any asset class, returns are
going to decrease. However, the volume of secondary
opportunities seriously outweighs the amount of capital
to be invested, so some figure that the return is not going
to decrease for a while. 
From 1991 through 2001, there was a huge increase
in the amount of venture capital commitments due to the
Internet bubble. When the Internet bubble burst, compa-
nies started rationalizing their investment strategies and
raising smaller funds. So even though venture capital
deals were substantially smaller, the desire for pension
funds and endowments to invest in venture capital
increased.
Here’s an explanation of the difference between 
private equity versus hedge funds. Private equity is more
of an illiquid asset class of controlled positions, whereas
hedge funds use trading strategies. There’s some major
discussion going on right now that blurs the distinctions
between hedge funds and private equity. This is, I
believe, due to the fact that hedge funds are striving to
find higher return areas, and a lot of people believe that
in the next five years, you’re not going to have private
equity and hedge funds, that it’s really just going to be a
combination called alternative assets.
We began our portfolio with a top-down approach
and now have a very mature, diversified portfolio (see
Table 13, p. 32). It started with a macro top-down
approach but then switched to a bottom-up approach: we
selected the best partners and focused on adding value to
the existing portfolio.
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The main reason why you should be looking into pri-
vate equity is for superior risk-adjusted return. The VRS is
a $43 billion fund. We have a 5 percent allocation in pri-
vate equity. Within that allocation, we have varying sub-
sectors with a different risk return profile. This affects our
overall mix, asset allocation, and the opportunity to put
substantial dollars to work in specific asset classes. 
When you decide to build a program, it takes spe-
cialized resources, and there are two ways to do this.
Although it takes time, you can either build those
resources internally, or you can utilize external expertise.
I think the best way is to do a combination of the two.
Hire outside help to get the program going, but at the
same time have an internal staff that is being educated by
this external specialist to develop a portfolio. 
There’s a substantial increase in private equity invest-
ments in both Europe and North America (see Table 16,
p. 33). In my perfect world, I would like to see 40 per-
cent venture capital, 40 percent buyout, and 20 percent
distressed, growth, and other special situations. At VRS,
our venture capital allocation is 18 percent. We are in
some very good, brand-name venture capital firms and
we’re trying to get as large an allocation to them as pos-
sible, but we are not going to stretch to invest venture
capital dollars just to fill up a bucket.
You also need vast, specialized resources to deal
source, find the best opportunity set possible, conduct
due diligence on specific groups, monitor investments,
and do the accounting. What are some strategies to over-
come resource constraints? Start off with an adviser, hire
a staff to work with the adviser to learn the ins and outs
of the business, develop you own expertise, and then
wean off the consultant.
SL IDE 1 SLIDE 2
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D I S C U S S I O N
Golden, Alouf, and Masuda, moderated by Nakamura
MR.  NAKAMURA: Money allocated to alternative invest-
ments in Japan is steadily increasing from 2000, and, at
the end of last year, 18 percent of pension funds were
invested in hedge funds. However, there were only fifteen
pension funds investing in private equity. The first ques-
tion is ”Why private equity? What are the objectives,
advantages, and broader significance?“ Mr. Golden, in the
case of Princeton University’s endowment, what sort of
objective did you have in mind when you first started
investing in private equity?
MR. GOLDEN: Our objective of gaining a high return is
the main reason why we invest in this area. We felt that it
would make sense to take the risk if we could earn a 10
percent real return after inflation. Others often say that
the reason to invest in private equity is to diversify, but I
think that is overstated. 
MR. NAKAMURA: Mr. Alouf, can you give us your
explanation and give us some percentages for determin-
ing private equity investments? 
MR. ALOUF: The current overall allocation mix for pri-
vate equity is 5 percent. When we got into private equity
back in 1989, the risk-re t u rn possibilities were much higher
than what they are today. Our overall program’s net
return has been 23.7 percent since inception. If you made
our existing market value $1.00, our net IRR would still be
at 18 percent.   Going forward, I’m hoping for net returns
of 12 percent to 15 percent for venture capital for the top-
quartile performers. These returns might seem low, but if
you also expect the U.S. public markets to be returning
about 7 percent over the same time period, then you are
still outperforming the public markets.
MR. NAKAMURA: Mr. Masuda, can you tell us your
thoughts on why pension funds in Japan should invest in
private equity? 
MR. MASUDA : Well, I do think that in the current envi-
ronment, there’s more to gain from the stock market than
private equity because the risk premium on equities is
coming down. However, top-line growth can be attained
through private equity, and, even though there are differ-
ences among managers, that would be the main reason to
incorporate private equity into the portfolio. Also, when
setting up a private equity program, Japanese investors
have to think globally. Otherwise, this asset class will
probably not see success. 
MR. GOLDEN: When I mentioned return prospects earlier,
I was talking in dollar terms. Japanese investors should
think about whether now is a good time to enter this mar-
ket. The duration of private equity investments is very
long, so it would be impossible to effectively hedge the
risks of deploying yen right now as dollars. I am also con-
tinuing to invest in the United States, not because we’ll
earn anything like those returns going forward for the
next several years, but only to maintain relationships for
when times are good. So I do not know why anyone
would start new relationships now. I would wait until
there’s so much pain from investors and they flee certain
managers. That’s when you can start a relationship. One
source of return is entering at low valuations. Outside the
United States, we have been inhibited from investing with
private equity managers in many cases because they don’t
set a high enough bar.
MR. NAKAMURA:  Mr. Alouf, what kind of process did
you go through in the very beginning of VRS’s private
equity program? What did you examine, how did you
develop internal resources, and so forth?
MR. ALOUF: Regarding asset allocation, we were victims
of the Internet bubble, and when venture capital funds
started doubling in size in a very frenetic pace, we did not
take our pro rata allocation. Instead of investing say $20,
$40, or $80 million, we stayed at $20 million. So that was
a very fortunate discipline, since we thought the pace was
way too fast. However, we are paying the price for that
now, since managers are coming back with funds half the
size. So there is a lot of discussion as to why we should
be allowed to increase our pro rata allocation from a prior
fund. Also, we don’t purport that we can always find top-
quartile managers since only one out of four is going to
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be in the top quartile. We looked back at our perform-
ance and found that only two-thirds of our managers are
first or second quartile performers. The reason our returns
are so outsized is because we really chose the correct top
quartile manager, meaning the one that really outperf o rm e d .
As far as developing a program, we have seventy dif-
f e re n t general partners and we have three investment pro-
fessionals managing those relationships and looking for
new deals. What we are doing now is to try and find the
best new talent out there by using an adviser to help us
out with what we call smaller or emerging managers. 
MR. NAKAMURA: Mr. Golden, in terms of internal
resources and set up, how did Princeton increase private
equity investments and resources?
MR. GOLDEN: We take a bottom-up approach, so we
have increased our commitments opportunistically. It just
so happens that we found a number of great managers
this year and last year, but next year it may be much
smaller. In terms of staff, we have grown very slowly.
One might think that our growth pattern ties directly into
our ability to find top quartile managers. Going forward,
I do not believe the top quartile will be good enough to
make an attractive program. There are so many more
managers out there but there can only be so many great
venture capital and buyout firms. Yet the number of total
firms seems limitless, which is another reason we should
all be cautious.
MR. NAKAMURA: For Japanese pension funds thinking
about funds of funds, what should they look for? 
MR. MASUDA : Normally there is a minimum commit-
ment of $5 to $20 million, and I believe fund of fund man-
agers have direct access to certain types of assets. That
usually means the fund is more globally balanced. But
you have to be careful of fund of funds as well. You have
to determine what the target, or investment, is. Does it
match your need? You should meet as many managers as
you can, since there’s a huge difference from one to
another. Also, if you think the fund of funds is too large,
then you can set up your own relationship in buyouts and
choose a particular emerging manager.
MR. ALOUF:  One thing to be careful about is when a
fund of funds tells you to put more money into the mar-
ket. You’re either taking a bigger investment with larger
funds, or you’re creating an index type of fund. Be care-
ful of the growth and assets of the fund of fund. Once
they become an index fund, or if they start putting large
amounts of capital into the biggest funds, your returns are
not going to be very attractive.
MR. NAKAMURA: Mr. Golden, what’s your view about
the use of the secondary market when establishing a 
private equity program?
MR. GOLDEN: We occasionally buy in the secondary
market as a way of augmenting a relationship, but for
those just starting out, they would need to hire a special-
ist. There is another layer of fees and conflicting interests
for the fund of fund to deploy more assets. I think there
is some adverse selection in the secondary market so one
needs to be very selective because if funds are really
good, then you wonder why the limited partnership of
the fund is in need of liquidity. So, in general, I’m quite
skeptical.
MR. ALOUF: If you are entering the private equity world
and you want to make a substantial investment quickly,
use a secondary purchase and get a nice bit of vintage
year diversification. I think there are pockets of opportu-
nity in secondaries. However, the larger the position, the
less return potential you have. One thing we are looking
at right now is to possibly sell some funds that are basi-
cally reaching the end of their life just to get it off our
books. However, private equity is all about relationships,
so if you’re flipping something, over the short term that
might be okay, but as far as establishing long-term rela-
tionships, that won’t help you. 
MR. NAKAMURA: How do you evaluate Japanese com-
panies in terms of venture capital or buyouts?
MR. ALOUF: We have not made any investments in
Japanese or Asian private equity. Our allocation to
Western Europe is only 18 percent, and we’re expanding
a little there. I only have a staff of three, overseeing $7
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billion. About 82 percent of the investment is in the
United States, so my team is too busy to come over here.
I think there’s probably a lot of opportunity here that 
I don’t know about. However, from a time perspective, I
don’t know if that’s worth the return opportunity. If we
do look at Japan or Asia, it will probably be through a
fund of fund, someone that has experience and exposure
in the markets. I was talking to a fund of funds manager
who had invested in Japan ten years ago, and he told me
now was the time to get into the market. 
MR. GOLDEN: Our investment in Japan will depend on
two factors. One is the availability of top-quality private
equity investors to partner with and, second, the ability
for these private equity managers to improve fundamental
value at companies. That would seem to be dependent on
being able to restructure many of the companies that
present the best opportunities. However, how can one
restructure a company to the advantage of shareholders
while still maintaining promises to all stakeholders? This
is why private equity investing in Japan has been less
attractive in the past than elsewhere. 
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DR.  MASON: Welcome to this second Japan Roundtable
on Alternative Investments for the Japanese banking and
insurance communities. I would like to launch immedi-
ately into our discussion and start with a consideration of
portfolio valuation. Andy, what is Princo’s approach to
valuing its private equity portfolio? 
MR. GOLDEN: Valuing a private equity portfolio is very,
very hard. It’s more art than science. For us, we start with
numbers provided by the general partner, and most of 
the time, we’ll adjust them downward. As many of you
may know, the general partners have a wide berth when
valuing portfolios. There are more standards in venture
capital than in the buyout world. Venture capital tends to
be held at cost or less, until there’s some verifiable, or
additional, financing that comes in at a higher valuation.
That’s only written up if it involves an outside party, and
sometimes the valuation is not written up all the way. In
fact, only half of it is written up if that new party is a
strategic, rather than financial, inventory. Of course, a
venture capitalist will write down a company’s valuation
if there’s good reason to consider the company impaired. 
In the buyout world, there’s less of a standard. Some
buyout managers hold at lower cost or a lesser value if
there’s been some impairment. Others will compare to
similar companies. But the key question should be why
we should care what the value of the portfolio is at any
given moment. That may sound odd, but ultimately we
find out what the value is when the portfolio companies
are liquidated. Much more often than not, portfolio com-
panies have been liquidated at a higher value than what
they were being held at.
It is quite uncomfortable to not know exactly what
your portfolio is worth. However, history and theory
show that investors get rewarded for discomfort. They
should get rewarded; otherwise there would be no reason
to do uncomfortable things. I think that we can contrast
this to public markets, where I think there is an illusion
of knowing how much your portfolio is worth. You get
great precision but maybe not accuracy. My support for
that outrageous statement is when one looks at the
volatility in the public market, it is hard to believe that the
true economic value of a company is as volatile as its
share price. The decision is largely made on qualitative
factors and understanding what is going on with the com-
panies and partnerships. That’s based as much on quali-
tative issues as it is on quantitative analysis.
MR. ALOUF: I’ll break down valuations into two pieces:
what I encourage the managers to do and how I value a
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portfolio when looking at a potential investment oppor-
tunity. 
I prefer not be surprised with anything on the down-
side. I encourage my managers to keep things at cost. On
the venture side, the write-ups are okay if you have
another round of financing with an independent third
party validating the new valuation or with the sale of the
company. On the buyout side, once again, I prefer that
they be held at cost. I would rather surprise investors on
the upside. How do I look at valuations when I’m look-
ing at a new opportunity? On the venture side, how do
you value a business that has no earnings? They can tell
me about a new opportunity that sounds like a great mar-
ket. However, I don’t know how many other players are
out there feeding on the exact same market. A rule of
thumb that a lot of people have talked about is in the
[Internet] bubble, when companies were talking valua-
tions in the billions. A lot of software companies today
talk about exit valuations of no more than $200 million.
So if you’re looking for the amount of capital a venture
group is putting into a software business, I don’t want to
see them get overvalued with putting more than $20 mil-
lion in because these are still risky investments. If you
don’t have the opportunity to make ten times your
money, I prefer not to see them doing it. I believe the
venture market has gotten a lot more conservative in the
pricing they’re paying for businesses. On the buyout side,
I look at the growth of earnings, as well as the debt level
of the business. A big trend in the U.S. buyout market
during the past year was recapitalizations. “Recaps” don’t
get a gold star from my managers or me, since private
equity is about creating value. Recaps don’t create value;
all it is is utilizing an aggressive debt market. 
D I S C U S S I O N
A U D I E N C E : There are a lot of buyout firms that recapi-
talized deals last year to the limited partnerships, but they
still hold all the equities at the same valuation as before
the recapitalizations. In this case, do you encourage the
general partner to invest in a conservative way?
MR. ALOUF: The current situation is like revisiting 1998,
when purchase prices and debt levels started going up.
The difference between 1998 and today is that the rates
that they’re paying on the debt are much lower. In 1998,
you were looking more at debt multiples, but now, even
if the multiple still might be high on the earnings that
you’re paying, you need to look at the interest expense
that is being paid. It is nice to have the recap to get the
money back, but then I get worried about how much
leverage is being put on the business and what happens
when there’s a hiccup in the economy. The good thing
about this environment is that the rates they are paying
are lower. However, as far as creating value, I don’t view
that as a positive move by the manager because anybody
can do that. You’re not differentiating yourself from the
pack.
MR. GOLDEN: I am a little bit less concerned about
recapitalization. I think like many things in investing, it
depends on the facts and circumstances, but leverage
doesn’t kill companies. Bad use of leverage kills compa-
nies. So I think in some cases it’s a very smart thing to do.
It’s less probable that recaps are a source that adds value
unless you are very good at knowing how to do it. It’s
definitely not the same as improving the fundamentals of
a company.
A U D I E N C E : For a small operation, how do you delegate
who does what? Some people in my group are afraid of
making decisions because private equity investments are
so long term and you never know what’s going to happen.
MR. GOLDEN: I have fifteen colleagues, three of whom
are very senior colleagues. I consider them my partners,
and those three are each responsible for leading an effort
in one or more asset categories. Everyone below that is
really kept more as a generalist and works across differ-
ent asset categories. The decisions are processed with a
team approach, and we try to build a consensus. The
three senior colleagues and myself are called managing
directors, and we lead the effort to get a consensus. But
we all get to vote. It’s important to understand that all of
us are compensated on how well the overall fund does
and not on how well individual asset categories or invest-
ments did.
Our board has many important re s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,
including whether or not to change staff. One way we get
around the difficulties of evaluating a private equity port-
folio is by understanding the process used. We work very
hard to practice what we preach, or the importance of
qualitative factors in evaluating managers. So we supply
our board with investment memos that explain in advance
what our thinking is. We have the authority to hire and
fire outside managers, but we write memos reporting our
thoughts on why we did something.
A U D I E N C E : Does that cause a problem if one investment
turned out to be a failure? 
MR. GOLDEN: I wish only one investment turned out to
be a failure. Investing is like backgammon, not chess.
There’s luck involved. There are dice that get thrown, and
part of the motivation behind focusing on the entire
endowment rather than on segments of it is a thing like
compensation. The more plays involved, the more indi-
vidual decisions that we can bundle up, the more we can
diversify. We expect many of our investments to turn out
badly. Some will be because of bad decisions. Others will
be because the dice came up the wrong way, but you
cannot invest in these areas if you are frightened of failure .
MR. ALOUF: That’s one of the tough things with private
equity. You’re reminded of the investment decision again
and again and again until the ten-year time horizon is up
and hopefully the manager will be liquidating on time.
We have had situations where investments have not turn e d
out well. If the investment decisions were poor, that’s one
thing. But when you have managers that are acting not in
the LP’s best interest and are out to benefit only them-
selves, they hold on to these portfolio companies and
won’t sell them to eke out extra management fees. That
becomes a real issue. To deal with this in court, you need
a 75 percent vote to dissolve the partnership and that’s
very difficult to get and extremely time consuming. I went
through this a couple of years ago, and I’m going through
it right now. It’s very frustrating. This is one of the nega-
tive aspects you have to be prepared to deal with.
DR.  MASON: Can you give us some sense of the com-
position and character of your boards? In particular, how
well do they understand alternative investing in general
and private equity investing in particular? We’ve noted
that there are often a range of successful high-net-worth
individuals on the boards of many U.S. endowments who
themselves have been very active in, for example, hedge
fund investing.
MR. GOLDEN: There are nine outside directors on the
board, four of whom are involved in investing profes-
sionally. We do have two investment bankers, but I don’t
know if they qualify as investors. The chairman of my
board is a founder of one of the longest-standing venture
capital firms in Silicon Valley, so he “gets” venture capital.
Another member is a venture capitalist with one of the
oldest venture capital firms. He “gets” it. Another board
member runs a fund of hedge funds professionally. He
“gets” it. Another board member runs one of the largest
family offices. She “gets” it. The dialogue is much easier.
The secret, I think, to success is having smart bosses.
DR.  MASON: Is it safe to say that some of those board
members also help you get access to quality private equity
funds?
MR. GOLDEN: It is the case. It is hard to separate out the
results of individual board members as opposed to the
combined Princeton force. 
MR. ALOUF: I’m very envious. The board at VRS is made
up of state employees. They’re teachers, policemen, fire-
men, and the like. The board is advised by our investment
advisory committee, and our investment advisory committee
is made up of industry practitioners. They’re professors
and people that are knowledgeable about the markets.
They aren’t usually private equity professionals or hedge
funds professionals, but it will be people that have run
pension funds before, people that are currently chief
investment officers. I believe there are eight or nine peo-
ple on our investment advisory committee. We use them
as a sounding board and don’t tell them what we do one
way or the other. We don’t have to ask for their permis-
sion. We tell them this is our plan, do you think this is 
reasonable, and they’ll report their findings to the board
and then their board signs off if what we’re doing is okay.
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DR.  MASON: I’d like to move on to the theme of 
manager selection. John, how do you pick private equity
managers to invest in? 
MR. ALOUF: We look at countless opportunities. Our
basic process usually starts off with a meeting at VRS. I try
to limit the meeting to one hour because we meet so
many different groups. After that I’ll go back, usually
make a few phone calls to people that I know that are
potential investors, have invested in the companies, or
someone that is co-invested with the group to see if it
sounds like a decent opportunity.
If the phone calls work out okay, it’s a trip to see the
manager. I usually spend half a day to a day in their
offices getting a very thorough look at their process and
their track record, realized and unrealized. Then we come
back. That’s when the real due diligence kicks in, with
making many, many phone calls to many different peo-
ple. Experience helps since as your network grows, the
due diligence you’re able to do becomes more thorough.
So after due diligence is done, it requires writing an
investment recommendation. I let the CIO know there’s a
pending recommendation coming her way. We submit a
recommendation. The CIO, the Director, the Deputy CIO,
and our Chief Operating Officer read the recommenda-
tion, and they basically approve or do not approve the
investment recommendation.
However, for the entire five-plus years that I’ve been
at VRS, they have never turned down an investment that
we have proposed. As long as we can answer the tough
questions, [the CIO] is okay with our investments. Each
time I go to [the CIO], I do not assume that she’s going to
approve a recommendation, though. I make sure I have
all my boxes checked and all my thoughts about what she
might be asking.
What are the key features I look at when analyzing
someone? First, I look at the track record. You can’t lie
about realized numbers. I then look at developments in
the unrealized portfolio. I look at the growth, market
share, and debt levels. I also take a look at what the
proposition was, what the manager’s thoughts were going
in, and how that has worked out down the road. A big
thing for me is the manager’s reputation that I hear from
different references. And it’s not just about their ability,
but their integrity. When you’re locked up for ten years
with someone, you want to make sure that you trust a
manager and believe he/she has a lot of integrity. I also
look at deal flow. Do they have a different angle? Do they
have an expertise in a specific area? I also look at the mar-
ket in which they compete. Do they have a leg up on the
competition? I look at their strategy. I look at their
process, and I also look at how they’re able to add value
to portfolio companies. 
MR. GOLDEN : Our process is labor intensive. For a new
manager to get hired, we spend more than four hundred
hours before signing a contract. I personally spend about
twenty. I’m less thrilled about this role, but I also act as a
salesman. This is growing more and more important,
since getting access to the best managers is quite hard. It’s
important that we go to their office and show them how
important they are going to be to us. This is, in fact, why
I was in China. I was there to sell Princeton to managers,
but also to get firsthand understanding of something very
unfamiliar.
We look for a manager’s ability to create fundamen-
tal value. So in addition to making calls, talking to other
managers, and checking with investors about someone’s
reputation, we also spend a lot of time talking to portfolio
company management to understand how the private
equity manager has been engaged and what success the
manager had in helping executives make the company
better.
A U D I E N C E : In Japan, it’s more like getting selected by a
top-tier manager than the investor selecting them. 
As an investor, what can you do to be a better candidate
to be picked?
MR. GOLDEN: I’ve been doing a lot of work on h e d g e
funds, and I can tell you their selection is certainly a two-
way street. And I think it’s the same in private equity.
Essentially, all sales involve listening to what the customer
Panel II: Manager Selection
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needs and wants and explaining how you can fulfill those
needs and wants. I think that’s what the best managers
are looking for. For us, the prestige of Princeton makes
my sales job a lot easier. But other elements involve
action. We try to convince the manager about what we
won’t do to them, hope our conversations are stimulating
and are about important issues, and that we’re not a waste
of their time. We can also demonstrate that there’s a long
list of other managers that we can use as a reference. It’s
important to make connections, advise them on elements
of their business. This is more for emerging firms, but that
reputation of being a giver and not just a taker makes us
attractive to some managers.
MR. ALOUF: As state pension funds go, VRS is very well
regarded. We are one of the first in the industry to really
take hold of hedge funds. We’ve been in it since 1989, so
we’ve proven we’re a long-term investor. We have a very
easy process for a state pension fund. You don’t have to
come visit our board, nor do you have to give a presen-
tation. When you want a closing, you don’t have to wait
for some sort of meeting.
I agree that it’s a two-way street. The manager is
pitching himself to us, and I, at the same time, am pitch-
ing VRS to him. We try to be proactive. I always ask man-
agers about whom they see that are out there that they
really respect. Who’s in the deals with you, and who
looks at the world the same way you do. Since there are
so many different venture and buyout funds out there, we
try to call the ones coming out to the market three or six
months before they go public. I’ve got this speech I give.
“I’m sorry, we have to write big checks, but we are a
long-term investor. We really like your story. We’ve done
research on you,” I say. You need to show that you’ve
done the background work before you meet with them.
You need to get in front of the managers before they start
getting a lot of investor interest. 
Another thing that I’ve done is to form relationships
with placement agents. Now, you may ask why a good
fund would use a placement agent to raise funds.
Sometimes they want to diversify their client base. They’re
three times oversubscribed and need to hire a placement
agent to weed the investors out. This has worked a few
times for us in Europe, and because of the relationship 
I had with the agent, I knew what was coming down the
pipeline. That’s when you can be a little bit more proac-
tive and get in front.
A U D I E N C E : Do you try to have a specific number of new
managers you hope to work with at the start of the invest-
ment year?
MR. GOLDEN: No, we do everything bottom up. It
makes no sense to predetermine what you’re going to do
either in terms of numbers of relationships or funds
deployed. To do that would be risky, forcing money to
work in suboptimal funds, or arbitrarily taking a smaller
amount, or passing on very good funds because they had
the misfortune to show up during a year that was cro w d e d .
MR. ALOUF: Since our venture allocation is 18 percent,
I’m not going to stretch that to fill up a bucket just so I
have an allocation of venture capital. For example, we
have six deals closing in March. Six! Since we only have
t h ree people, I’ve had to adjust our schedule about looking
into new opportunities. Basically we can’t look at new deals
until June. The last thing I want to do is shortchange m y
due diligence process so that I can put in a new manager.
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DR.  MASON: Let’s now turn to fund monitoring and per-
formance measurement. Andy, what is the approach at
Princo? 
MR. GOLDEN: Fund monitoring is labor intensive. We
spend between six and twelve days for each active rela-
tionship we have per year, and I’m not including travel or
back-office time. I’m also not including portfolio over-
head or the monitoring of the collection as opposed to
the individual elements. I think “monitoring” is perhaps
the wrong word. What we’re really trying to do is to help
the manager, as well as keep an eye on things.
One element that’s important in this monitoring
process is that we typically serve on advisory committees
or boards for each manager, which creates a very natural
way of spending time together. Sometimes we help the
manager think about their business. Not every manager
wants advice, but it’s just a very effective way of building
consensus around what the manager has already decided.
We can also be helpful in acting as a conduit for managers
to get to know each other. This is most notable with con-
necting domestic managers with foreign managers. 
On the question of measuring performance, I think
many times the question and answer is more complicated
than it appears. We don’t get too tied up in the quantitative,
but focus on qualitative assessment. Often when we have
to make the decision to invest in the next fund, it’s really
more a question of the fundamentals of the company than
what might be stated as the performance to date.
How can I be this confident when it seems so hard
to measure performance? Experience has taught me that
things tend to work out even better than estimated. A little
leap of faith is often rewarded.
MR. ALOUF: I spend between 75 percent to 80 percent
of my time looking at new opportunities, because our
investments are over a ten-year period. Once I’m in, I’m
stuck with them. So I better make sure that I’ve made a
very thorough and thoughtful judgment.
How do we monitor funds? In my mandate, I have to
visit the manager at least once a year. I like to visit more,
but I can’t. I naturally have a better rapport with some
managers than others. I also try to make sure I at least
have several conversations through the year in addition to
my visit, but there are other managers that I talk to once
a month. Usually the ones I talk to once a month are not
the largest. I get a lot of value from the middle-market guys.
A lot of my fund monitoring is also for an upcoming
fund: what are the developments in the partnership, how
are the existing investments going, and what’s the state of
the market? You must get a good feel for the manager.
How do they articulate their strategy, and how has it
evolved based on how the environment has changed? 
I like contrasting what different managers say about the
market and how they’ve reacted to it. I also use my exist-
ing managers to source new deals through someone that
they respect in the industry. 
To measure the performance of private equity invest-
ments, you can look at IRRs and capital return. I don’t
want to see 100 percent or 200 percent IRR and get my
money back in four months, but at the same time, I don’t
want to see a deal that has a multiple of four over fifteen
years. One of the most difficult questions to answer is
how to evaluate the performance of a venture capital
manager because of the Internet bubble. Is the outsized
performance the manager had from 1996 to 1998 due to
them or due to the market? Is their negative performance
between 2000 and 2003 them or the market? How much
incentive does the manager have to work as hard as he
did in the past?
I also don’t try and make an adjustment to the mar-
ket values of my managers at the end of a quarter and
think the value should be X or Y. However, when I am
looking at a manager to determine if I want to do a re-up,
that’s when I’ll go ahead and do the adjustments myself.
DR.  MASON: Let’s open up the discussion to some of the
Japanese participants who have invested in private equity
so they can compare their experiences and approaches. 
A U D I E N C E : For my firm in Japan, about two-thirds of the
funds we invest in are offshore. So it’s very difficult to
Panel III: Fund Monitoring and Perf o rmance Measure m e n t
meet managers once a year. We try to visit them during
the annual meeting of these funds when it’s at all possi-
ble. Does it make a difference when you see a manager,
whether it’s at the annual meeting or in a separate visit? 
MR. GOLDEN: I think annual meetings are often a waste
of time. 
MR. ALOUF: You do receive a lot of overview materials
at annual meetings, but you don’t get to hear exactly what
your hot button issues are or your concerns. However, a
lot of times annual meetings are a good way to develop
other questions. I enjoy portfolio company presentations
to watch developments. In addition, there are other limited
partners that are there, and I bounce thoughts and ideas
off of them. Also, I do get to meet the lower level staff
that generally I don’t get a lot of exposure to. I think this
is the key to finding out the quality of the troops behind
the big names. This could be the opportunity to meet
someone who could be a new manager down the road.
Also, a lot of times I found that when you talk to the gen-
eral partners, they’re pretty rehearsed and they know
exactly how to answer your question. The farther you go
down in the ranks, the less polished they are, and the
more information they’ll share with you.
I do find value in the annual meetings, but if you
want to ask certain questions, you can get your answers
a lot quicker through a face-to-face meeting.
A U D I E N C E : Sure, sometimes I get confused by these
annual meetings held at posh resorts. What exactly is the
objective? But I like attending them because we can net-
work with other limited partners. That’s a bigger, more
important value. Sometimes they give us names of fund
managers that we weren’t aware of and that is helpful. So
I can’t say it’s a total waste of time.
A U D I E N C E : Disclosure from managers is a tough thing in
Japan. There aren’t enough laws in Japan that require dis-
closure, so we try to pick a manager that is willing to
share information. The U.S. Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) got a lot of press coverage for a while, but it has
died down. What is the situation right now about this law?
MR. ALOUF: FOIA is still a hot issue, but it has calmed
down. FOIA is why VRS is trying to be a proactive limited
partner. When we first heard that the FOIA would require
us to disclose our portfolio company data, we said, “Look.
We have great brand-name private equity firms we’ve
invested in, and if we start divulging portfolio company
data, we basically have wasted this great network.”
We boxed up every quarterly and annual report from
our different general partners, and we shipped them to
the managers. We asked them to ship it back to us when
nobody was asking for that information. That went a long
way. Secondly, we worked very hard and actually got an
exemption from the legislature. The wording wasn’t
exactly what we wanted, so we then went to the Attorney
General and got an additional opinion that states that we
do not need to provide portfolio company data. 
VRS tries to stay out of the news. I just like to sit back
and mind my own business. That makes my life easier. So
far, the FOIA issue has not been a reason as to why we
weren’t able to invest with any of our top-tier managers.
DR.  MASON: I heard that CALPers tried to create a buffer
company between themselves and some of the funds
they’re in so that the buffer company would receive all
the primary information instead of CALPers. The pension
manager would then ask questions to this buffer company
as needed. In this way, CALPers reasoned that if they
were sued for disclosure, they could truthfully deny 
having possession of the information. But I don’t think
that’s a common practice.
A U D I E N C E : I find it very difficult to monitor venture cap-
ital funds, especially the ones that invest in IT and
biotechnology. I can’t keep up with all the new inven-
tions, gadgets, and lingo because by the time I understand
it, it’s old.
MR. ALOUF: I completely agree with you. When I first
started at VRS, I told myself that I was going to under-
stand technology and biotech. But I realized that by the
time I read about something in the industry journals, the
material was outdated.
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I think some of the venture managers that are really
honest, a lot of times they don’t know about these new
technologies either. They often hear about it from the
portfolio companies, other entrepreneurs, or venture part-
ners that are really closer to the street. The fact is, when
you have a large company looking to buy a new product,
do you want to buy it from this small venture company
that might not be around tomorrow, or do you want to
buy it from an established player where the product might
not be as beneficial? Do you want to be the guinea pig or
the first client that takes on the beta risk? There are a lot
of good companies that don’t make it because it’s hard to
get these new companies to buy things. In addition, many
chief technology officers are cutting back on their staff.
It’s getting harder today for a venture-backed company to
make it. 
One way I look at some venture firms is to look at
the companies they’ve spawned in the past. Are these
companies still viable or still around? Many times, success
breeds success. As one successful company is created,
there will be two or three spinouts from there. 
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